When Cheating Is Good and Cooperation Is Bad: Conspiracies and the Continuing Violations Doctrine Under the Sherman Act by Hills, Brianna S.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 83 
Issue 1 Winter 2018 Article 11 
Winter 2018 
When Cheating Is Good and Cooperation Is Bad: Conspiracies and 
the Continuing Violations Doctrine Under the Sherman Act 
Brianna S. Hills 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brianna S. Hills, When Cheating Is Good and Cooperation Is Bad: Conspiracies and the Continuing 
Violations Doctrine Under the Sherman Act, 83 MO. L. REV. (2018) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 NOTE 
When Cheating Is Good and Cooperation Is 
Bad: Conspiracies and the Continuing 
Violations Doctrine Under the Sherman Act 
In re Pre-filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) 
Brianna S. Hills* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Courts have long recognized that statutes of limitation may be equitably 
adjusted under certain circumstances.1  In other instances, courts have adjusted 
the statute of limitations not by making an equitable exception but by changing 
the definition of when the statute begins to run in the first instance.2  In the 
antitrust context, courts have done the latter, occasionally invoking the contin-
uing violations doctrine.3  This doctrine allows a claimant to restart the limita-
tions period if there is an overt act alone sufficient to be an antitrust violation.4  
The period restarts even if the overt act is performed under a pattern or course 
of prior violations that may have occurred outside of the limitations period.5 
 
*B.A., University of Missouri, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2018; Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  I would like to 
extend a special thank you to Professor Thomas A. Lambert for helping me to catch the 
“antitrust bug” and for advising me in writing this Note.  I would also like to thank the 
entire Missouri Law Review staff for their support and guidance. 
 1. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946) (recognizing equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitations under the New York Civil Practice Act and holding 
that “[e]quity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility.  Equity has acted on 
the principle that ‘laches is not, like limitation, a mere matter of time; but principally a 
question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced, – an inequity founded 
upon some change in the condition or relations of the property or the parties’” (quoting 
Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373 (1892))). 
 2. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338–
39 (1971) (explaining that each time the plaintiff is harmed by a new act of conspiracy 
to violate the antitrust laws the statute of limitations resets). 
 3. See In re Pre-filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig. (“Ferrellgas II”), 860 F.3d 
1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc); see also Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 338–39; Varner 
v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1018–20 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 4. See Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 338–39. 
 5. See id. 
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The Eighth Circuit considered the issue in In re Pre-filled Propane Tank 
Antitrust Litigation in the context of a price-fixing conspiracy among manu-
facturers of propane tanks.6  This Note considers the framework employed by 
the majority and goes on to suggest ways to refine that framework to reduce 
error costs and protect competition.  To do so, an appropriate continuing vio-
lations rule must advance two seldom-advised ends: encouraging cheating and 
discouraging communication. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In the wake of increasing propane costs between 2006 and 2008, the two 
largest distributors of pre-filled propane tanks reduced the fill level of their 
tanks from seventeen pounds to fifteen pounds.7  At the time of the price in-
crease, the two distributors, Ferrellgas and AmeriGas (“Defendants”), made up 
approximately eighty percent of the American market for pre-filled propane 
exchange tanks.8  Pre-filled propane exchange tanks (“propane tanks”) are used 
to power outdoor grills and heaters and can typically be filled with up to twenty 
pounds of propane.9  In 2009, a class action was filed on behalf of a group of 
purchasers of propane tanks from retailers of the Defendants (“2009 Class”).10  
The 2009 Class alleged that Defendants had colluded to reduce the amount of 
propane in their tanks while maintaining the same price per tank, effectively 
increasing the price of the tanks.11  The complaint alleged that colluding to 
increase prices violated section 1 of the Sherman Act in addition to state anti-
trust and consumer protection statutes.12 
In its amended complaint, the 2009 Class, composed of indirect purchas-
ers,13 defined their class differently, referring to the class members’ common-
 
 6. Ferrellgas II, 860 F.3d at 1063–64. 
 7. In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig. (“Ferrellgas I”), 834 F.3d 943, 
945 (8th Cir. 2016), vacated en banc, 860 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 8. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Ferrellgas II, 860 F.3d 1059 (No. 
15-2789). 
 9. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d at 945. 
 10. Id. at 945–46.  The class was created by consolidating individual cases to a 
single class in the Western District of Missouri.  Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
supra note 8, at 7. 
 11. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d at 945–46.  Although the amount of propane in each 
tank was decreased, the tanks were correctly advertised.  Id. 
 12. Id. at 946. 
 13. Litigants that do not purchase the product or service at issue directly from the 
defendant in an antitrust case but instead purchase from an innocent downstream seller 
are referred to as “indirect purchasers.”  See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION ¶ 320b (4th ed. 2017).  Indirect purchasers are subject to additional pro-
cedural limitations to filing suit, discussed infra. 
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/11
2018] WHEN CHEATING IS GOOD AND COOPERATION IS BAD 197 
ality as “persons who purchased a [p]ropane [t]ank sold, marketed, or distrib-
uted by any Defendant during the applicable limitations period.”14  Settlement 
negotiations ensued with both Defendants, and the 2009 Class moved for pre-
liminary approval of the resulting settlement agreements in early December 
2009.15  Both settlement agreements defined the class slightly differently.  The 
AmeriGas agreement defined the settlement class as “people who purchased or 
exchanged one or more of AmeriGas’s pre-filled propane gas cylinders in the 
United States not for resale, between June 15, 2009[,] and November 30, 
2009.”16  The Ferrellgas agreement defined the class as “people who purchased 
or exchanged one or more of Ferrellgas’s pre-filled propane gas cylinders in 
the United States not for resale, between June 15, 2009[,] and the date of Pre-
liminary Approval.”17  The district court18 granted approval of the settlement 
agreements.19 
Over three years later, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued a 
complaint alleging price fixing against the Defendants arising out of the effec-
tive price increase on their propane tanks in 2008.  After several months, a 
group of both direct and indirect purchasers filed the suit at issue (“2014 
Class”).20  The complaint again alleged that the Defendants colluded to fix 
prices in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.21 
The antitrust claims were all subject to a four-year statute of limitations.22  
The first complaint in this matter was filed in June 2014.23  However, because 
the FTC filed an administrative complaint on March 27, 2014, the start of the 
limitations period was adjusted to March 27, 2010.24  The district court held 
that the claims of the 2014 Class were barred by the statute of limitations.25  
The 2014 Class also asserted several equitable tolling theories, but the district 
court did not find them persuasive.26  The district court granted Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss.27 
The 2014 Class, made entirely of retailers that purchased tanks directly 
from the defendants, appealed.28  For their sole point on appeal, the 2014 Class 
 
 14. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d at 946 (quoting complaint). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. (quoting AmeriGas settlement agreement). 
 17. Id. (quoting Ferrellgas settlement agreement). 
 18. The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western 
District of Missouri, presiding. Id. at 945 n.1. 
 19. Id. at 946. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2012). 
 23. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 8, at 13. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at i. 
 26. Id. at 13. 
 27. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2016), vacated en banc, 860 F.3d 
1059 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 28. Id. 
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argued that the district court erred in dismissing the claims as barred by the 
statute of limitations, instead alleging that the continuing violations theory ap-
plied.29  It claimed that the continuing violations theory, which says that the 
statute of limitations should restart after each violation of the statute, would 
have prevented the dismissal below.30  The 2014 Class alleged that two types 
of overt acts by the Defendants suffice to restart the statute of limitations: (1) 
continued sales at supracompetitive31 prices to members of the class; and (2) 
“conspiratorial communications between Defendants” used to maintain and 
police their collusive agreement to raise prices.32 
On appeal, a divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed the decision of the 
district court, holding that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.33  
The panel reasoned that while the continuing violations doctrine was cogniza-
ble as a mechanism for extending the statute of limitations under the Sherman 
Act, the two overt acts asserted by the class did not meet the requirements of 
the doctrine.34  The panel majority held that the continuing violations doctrine 
did not apply unless the plaintiff specifically alleges a novel and overt act that 
constitutes a repeated invasion of the plaintiff’s interests; mere performance or 
reaffirmation of the prior invasion does not suffice.35  The Eighth Circuit 
granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel decision, and – again divided – 
reversed.36 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Sherman Act is a broad antitrust statute that prohibits contracts, com-
binations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, as well as anticompetitive be-
havior by monopolists.37  All claims brought under the Sherman Act, including 
section 1 claims, have a four-year statute of limitations after which the cause 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Supracompetitive is the term used in antitrust jurisprudence and scholarship 
for prices, profits, or output above the competitive market level, usually as a result of 
anticompetitive conduct.  See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
509 U.S. 209, 223–24 (1993) (using the term “supracompetitive pricing” to refer to 
prices charged as a result of anticompetitive price coordination); Thomas A. Lambert, 
Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1715 (2005) (“A rule that pre-
cludes monopolists from cutting their supracompetitive prices, unless such price cuts 
are necessary to achieve productive efficiencies, is inconsistent with the very goal of 
antitrust law, which is to protect consumers from supracompetitive prices.”). 
 32. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d at 947. 
 33. Id. at 950. 
 34. Id. at 947–50. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Ferrellgas II, 860 F.3d 1059, 1062 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 37. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). The Sherman Antitrust Act 
was later amended and expanded by the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012). 
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of action is barred.38  Limitations periods in antitrust serve the same policy 
goals as in most other areas of law: “to put old liabilities to rest, to relieve 
courts and parties from ‘stale’ claims where the best evidence may no longer 
be available, and to create incentives for those who believe themselves 
wronged to investigate and bring their claims promptly.”39  Limiting the time 
period in which suits may be brought may be especially important in antitrust 
cases, given that many practices subject to antitrust scrutiny are both procom-
petitive and wrongly condemned in exchange for treble damages.40 
The statute of limitations begins to run “when a defendant commits an act 
that injures a plaintiff’s business.”41  When that injury occurs, “a cause of ac-
tion immediately accrues to [the plaintiff] to recover all damages incurred by 
that date and all provable damages that will flow in the future” from the acts of 
the defendant.42  When there are repeated violations of the statute, a “continu-
ing violation” occurs.43  Each continuing violation will restart the statute of 
limitations, and the statute will run from each “overt act” by the defendant.44  
To be an overt act, conduct by the defendant must meet two requirements: (1) 
the act “must be a new and independent act that is not merely a reaffirmation 
of a previous act, and (2) it must inflict new and accumulating injury on the 
plaintiff.”45  Acts that are the “inertial consequences of a single act do not re-
start the statute of limitations.”46 
To determine whether an act is an “inertial consequence” or “independent 
act,” courts have considered whether the plaintiff knew or should have known 
of the initial anticompetitive act.47  This explains the difference between treat-
ment of two types of antitrust violations: first, conspiratorial behavior such as 
naked or hidden price fixing, “where courts are quick to extend the statute for 
ongoing payments or meetings,” and second, unilateral or non-conspiratorial 
arrangements such as refusals to deal, tying, or exclusive dealing, “where the 
courts show much more reluctance.”48 
Eighth Circuit precedent largely conforms to this differentiation.  First, 
when the antitrust violation includes colluding to restrain competition or price 
fixing, a continuing violation can occur “when conspirators . . . meet to fine-
 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2012). 
 39. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 320a. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971). 
 42. Id. at 339. 
 43. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 2016), vacated en banc, 860 F.3d 
1059 (8th Cir. 2017); Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 237 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
 44. Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 45. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d at 947 (quoting Varner, 371 F.3d at 1019). 
 46. Id. (quoting Varner, 371 F.3d at 1019). 
 47. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 320c. 
 48. Id. 
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tune their cartel agreement”49 or where a monopolist “uses unlawfully acquired 
market power to charge an elevated price.”50  Second, when the antitrust viola-
tion includes use of unilateral, anticompetitive contracts, such as tying or ex-
clusive dealing arrangements, “[p]erformance of the alleged anticompetitive 
contracts during the limitations period is not sufficient to restart the period.”51  
Mergers that violate the antitrust laws would similarly fall into this latter cate-
gory, where post-merger sales by the merged firm would be inadequate to re-
start the limitations period.52 
A.  Acts Sufficient for Antitrust Violations Involving                        
Non-conspiratorial Behavior 
Many courts, including the Eighth Circuit,53 have taken the position that 
claims must be predicated on “some injurious act actually occurring during the 
limitations period, not merely the abatable but unabated inertial consequences 
of some pre-limitations action.”54  Under this test, “profits, sales, and other 
benefits accrued as the result of an initial wrongful act are not treated as inde-
pendent acts” but instead as “ripples caused by the initial injury, not as distinct 
injuries themselves.”55  This test centers around benefits accrued as a result of 
an anticompetitive contract, typically including exclusive dealing, tying, illegal 
merger, or refusal to deal, executed outside the limitations period that continues 
to cause anticompetitive prices and sales in the future.56 
 
 49. Midwestern Mach. Co. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 392 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(analyzing continuing violation theory under antitrust violation resulting from a mer-
ger). 
 50. In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 752 F.3d 728, 736–37 (8th 
Cir. 2014). 
 51. Varner, 371 F.3d 1011 at 1020 (analyzing continuing violation theory under 
anticompetitive “tying” arrangement) (citing Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d 149, 
160 (9th Cir. 1989)); accord Aurora Enters., Inc. v. NBC, 688 F.2d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 
1982)). 
 52. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 320c5 (noting “if there is one 
clear case where a subsequent act is a mere ‘reaffirmation’ rather than an ‘independent’ 
predicate act, it is the ongoing sales of the post-merger firm”); Midwestern Mach., 392 
F.3d at 271 (holding that post-merger sales were not independent overt acts capable of 
restarting the statute of limitations). 
 53. See Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d 943, 949 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Al George, Inc. v. 
Envirotech Corp., 939 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1991); Concord Boat Corp. v. Bruns-
wick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000)), vacated en banc, 860 F.3d 1059 (8th 
Cir. 2017). 
 54. Al George, 939 F.2d at 1274 (quoting Imperial Point Colonnades Condomin-
ium, Inc. v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d 1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 55. Z Techs. Corp. v. Lubrizol Corp., 753 F.3d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (distinguishing between conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial 
cases in applying the continuing violations theory). 
 56. See Aurora Enters., 688 F.2d at 694. 
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In the unilateral conduct or monopolization case in which there is no al-
legation of collusion, a price increase that is merely the result of the earlier 
anticompetitive agreement will generally not be sufficient to restart the statute 
of limitations.57  The same is not true for violations involving cartel behavior.58 
 
B.  Acts Sufficient for Antitrust Violations Involving Cartel Behavior 
and Price Fixing 
Courts are more willing to apply the continuing violations theory to 
claims involving collusive or cartel behavior.59  Horizontal cartel behavior60 
includes those antitrust violations in which the plaintiffs allege that the defend-
ant competitors at the same level in the distribution chain either expressly or 
impliedly agreed to restrain competition in some way.61  The classic and most 
obvious example is where two or more competitors agree to fix prices; how-
ever, agreements to divide markets, reduce output, rig bids, not to compete on 
quality, and others would also fall into this category, often called naked re-
straints on trade.62  Two types of conduct by cartel members are candidates for 
overt acts sufficient to restart the statute of limitations: (1) meeting to “fine-
tune” a collusive agreement and (2) continuing supracompetitive prices.63 
 
 
 57. See Z Techs., 753 F.3d at 598–99 (differentiating between collusion and non-
collusion claims under the continuing violation theory and holding that supracompeti-
tive prices resulting from a merger monopolization or unilateral monopolization will 
not suffice to restart the limitations period); Midwestern Mach., 392 F.3d at 271 (hold-
ing that price increases resulting from a merger were not overt acts but instead inertial 
consequences of the merger); Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d 149, 160 (9th Cir. 
1989) (“[R]eceipt of profits from an illegal contract by an antitrust defendant is not an 
overt act of enforcement which will restart the statute of limitations.”). 
 58. Z Techs., 753 F.3d 594, 601–02. 
 59. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 320c3 (“While the cases are not 
consistent, they are significantly more likely to restart the statute when the action com-
plained of is conspiratorial rather than unilateral.”). 
 60. For the purposes of this Note, only horizontal cartel behavior is considered.  
Vertical cartel behavior was not at issue in the present case.  Vertical cartel behavior 
could also create continuing violation liability, but it is a closer case.  See id. 
 61. See id. ¶ 1902. 
 62. See id. at ch. 19. 
 63. See id. ¶ 320c. 
7
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1.  Fine-Tuning by Cartel Members 
Courts agree that meeting to “fine-tune” a collusive agreement would 
constitute a novel overt act that would restart the limitations period; what con-
stitutes fine tuning, however, is not as clear.64  A meeting during which cartel 
members adjusted the price to be charged or the output levels for each cartel 
member would suffice because each decision would independently violate the 
antitrust laws.65  It follows that any meeting during which separate violations 
of the antitrust laws occurred would constitute an act capable of restarting the 
statute of limitations.  Conversely, if cartel members are merely maintaining 
membership in the cartel without making new decisions that affect the arrange-
ment, they will not be considered to be fine tuning a collusive agreement.  
Therefore, the limitations period will not reset. 
2.  Supracompetitive Prices 
Whether continuing high prices alone constitutes an overt act capable of 
restarting the limitations period is an even closer question.  In a 2014 case de-
cided by the Eighth Circuit, In re Wholesale Grocery Products Antitrust Liti-
gation, two dominant grocery wholesalers entered into an agreement that in-
cluded non-compete provisions based on their geographic market, otherwise 
known as a horizontal market division.66  As a result of the agreement, profit 
margins for wholesalers benefiting from the non-compete “were higher than 
possible in a competitive market.”67  On the issue of statute of limitations, the 
united Eighth Circuit panel held that “a monopolist commits an overt act each 
time he uses unlawfully acquired market power to charge an elevated price.”68  
The court found that even though the written non-compete was executed in 
September 2003 and the suit was not filed until December 2008, the statute of 
limitations did “not preclude . . . recover[y] for inflated prices charged within 
the four years before” the complaint was filed.69  The court reasoned that “it 
was not apparent until later that the wholesalers’ real agreement was . . . a 
blatant market division” and the limitations period only begins when “custom-
ers have reason to know of the violation and their damages are sufficiently 
 
 64. See Exhaust Unlimited, Inc. v. Cintas Corp., 326 F. Supp. 2d 928, 931–32 
(S.D. Ill. 2004). 
 65. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 320c2. 
 66. In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 752 F.3d 728, 729, 736 (8th 
Cir. 2014). 
 67. Id. at 731. 
 68. Id. at 736. 
 69. Id. at 737. 
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ascertainable to justify an antitrust action.”70  The Eighth Circuit purported to 
rely on Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp.71 on the statute of limitations issue.72 
In Klehr, the Supreme Court of the United States explained that: 
Antitrust law provides that, in the case of a continuing violation, say, a 
price-fixing conspiracy that brings about a series of unlawfully high 
priced sales over a period of years, each overt act that is part of the 
violation and that injures the plaintiff, e.g., each sale to the plaintiff, 
starts the statutory period running again, regardless of the plaintiff’s 
knowledge of the alleged illegality at much earlier times.73 
While this pronouncement would seem to definitively resolve the issue, be-
cause the Court was comparing the continuing violation theory to a similar 
theory under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”) statute of limitations, the language is only dicta.74  Regardless, courts 
have consistently cited the language from Klehr in affirming this rule.75 
 
 70. Id. at 736–37 (second quote quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, 
¶ 320c4). 
 71. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997). 
 72. Ferrellgas II, 860 F.3d 1059, 1066 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“The timeliness 
question in this case is controlled by Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp . . . .” (quoting In re 
Wholesale Grocery, 752 F.3d at 736)). 
 73. Klehr, 521 U.S. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted); Ferrellgas I, 834 
F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 2016), vacated en banc, 860 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 74. Klehr, 521 U.S. at 186–87 (using analogous antitrust principles to decide the 
statute of limitations under RICO’s statute of limitations and “last predicate act” rule). 
 75. See In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 290–91 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(“[I]n cases like this one involving allegations of ‘a price-fixing conspiracy that brings 
about a series of unlawfully high priced sales over a period of years, each overt act that 
is part of the violation and that injures the plaintiff, e.g., each sale to the plaintiff, starts 
the statutory period running again.’” (quoting Klehr, 521 U.S. at 189)); Morton’s Mkt., 
Inc. v. Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Klehr, 521 
U.S. at 189) (holding that with each sale of milk a price-fixed price constitutes a new 
overt act), amended in part, 211 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2000); Z Techs. Corp. v. Lubrizol 
Corp., 753 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Klehr, 521 U.S. at 189); Oliver v. SD-
3C LLC, 751 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Klehr, 521 U.S. at 189); In re 
Wholesale Grocery, 752 F.3d at 736 (holding in the antitrust context that the question 
of statute of limitations “is controlled by Klehr”); Molecular Diagnostics Labs. v. Hoff-
mann-La Roche Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 276, 286 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Klehr, 521 U.S. 
at 189) (holding that each sale at a supracompetitive price constituted a continuing vi-
olation). 
9
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IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
A. The Eighth Circuit Panel Decision Below 
The Eighth Circuit panel – before rehearing en banc – affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims as time barred under the statute of 
limitations.76 
After discussing the continuing violation theory, the Eighth Circuit panel 
turned to the arguments on appeal.77  The Class asserted the question of 
whether each sale of propane tanks by the defendants at supracompetitive 
prices under the price-fixing conspiracy constituted a continuing violation was 
controlled by Klehr.78  The majority did not find the argument persuasive.  In-
stead, it restricted Klehr to its facts, holding “the primary purpose” of the lan-
guage related to the antitrust continuing violation theory announced in Klehr 
“was to clarify that, unlike under the last predicate act rule applied by the Third 
Circuit to RICO claims, the commission of a separate new overt act generally 
does not permit the plaintiff to recover for the injury caused by old overt acts 
outside the limitations period.”79  Here, the Eighth Circuit majority interpreted 
Klehr as “not pronounc[ing] a new principle with respect to what constitutes a 
continuing violation under the Sherman Act.”80 
After rejecting that Klehr controlled, the majority attempted to distinguish 
Wholesale Grocery.81  In that case, decided just two years earlier, two grocery 
wholesalers entered into an agreement to divide territory.82  The Eighth Circuit 
held that the continuing violations theory applied and although the agreement 
was executed outside the limitations period, “the anticompetitive nature of the 
wholesalers’ agreement was not revealed until several years after,” such that 
the subsequent “price increase by the wholesalers restarted the statute of limi-
tations.”83  Here, the Eighth Circuit panel found that Wholesale Grocers was 
inapposite and instead demonstrative of and “consistent with other decisions in 
which [it] held that in order to restart the statute of limitations, more than the 
mere performance or reaffirmation of an unlawful agreement is required to sat-
isfy the overt act requirement of a continuing antitrust violation.”84 
 
 76. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d at 945. 
 77. Id. at 946. 
 78. Id. at 947. 
 79. Id. at 947–48 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Klehr, 521 U.S. at 
189). 
 80. Id. at 948. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (first quote quoting In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 752 
F.3d 728, 729, 736 (8th Cir. 2014)). 
 84. Id. at 948–49. 
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The majority then turned to the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding conduct 
that should be sufficient.85  First, the majority held “the sales of 15 pound tanks 
to Plaintiffs were the mere, unabated consequences of the original agreement 
between Defendants to lower the fill level of the propane tanks while maintain-
ing the same price.”86  Instead, the majority, relying on Varner v. Peterson 
Farms, believed the additional sales at supracompetitive prices as a result of 
collusive price fixing were “mere reaffirmations of the agreement . . . insuffi-
cient to restart the limitations period.”87 
Second, the majority considered whether additional communications by 
Defendants would be sufficient to restart the limitations period.88  Plaintiffs 
alleged that Defendants regularly communicated to monitor one another for 
compliance with their agreement and to “check that neither cheated on their 
anticompetitive agreement.”89  According to the majority, Plaintiffs did not al-
lege any changing or fine-tuning of the agreement occurred at those meetings.90  
This fact was dispositive, and the majority held the communications “merely 
reaffirm and monitor the existing conspiracy but do not constitute overt acts 
sufficient to restart the statute of limitations.”91  Finding both of these acts in-
sufficient, the majority held that because the original unlawful agreement fell 
outside the limitations period, “claims that Defendants [were] engaging in a 
continuing antitrust violation must fail.”92 
The majority further justified its holding on policy grounds, asserting that 
“antitrust law reflects a ‘congressional objective of encouraging civil litigation 
not merely to compensate victims but also to turn them into private attorneys 
general.’”93  The majority noted that “[t]he limitations period plays a role in 
limiting the public harm.”94  Apparently finding the public harm occurred only 
in 2008 when the original agreement to raise price was made and not in subse-
quent sales at anticompetitive prices, the majority found its decision was con-
sistent with “the objectives of Congress in encouraging timely lawsuits for the 
public good.”95 
Judge Duane Benton dissented.96  Contrary to the majority opinion, the 
dissent concluded Klehr controlled and quoted the relevant portion of that opin-
ion: 
 
 85. Id. at 949. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (citing Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 950. 
 93. Id. (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 550 (2000)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting). 
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Antitrust law provides that, in the case of a ‘continuing violation,’ 
say, a price-fixing conspiracy that brings about a series of unlawfully 
high priced sales over a period of years, each overt act that is part of the 
violation and that injures the plaintiff, e.g., each sale to the plaintiff, 
starts the statutory period running again, regardless of the plaintiff’s 
knowledge of the alleged illegality at much earlier times.97 
The dissent argued that the majority’s attempt to skirt the language in Klehr by 
limiting its application to RICO cases was erroneous because “federal courts 
‘are not free to limit Supreme Court opinions to the facts of each case.’”98  
Moreover, even as dicta, the rule announced in Klehr should control because 
“federal courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as 
firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings,” especially where dicta “is of recent 
vintage and not enfeebled by any later statement.”99  For Judge Benton, “the 
rule [was] clear” and controlling.100 
Next, the dissent pointed out the inapplicability of another case on which 
the majority relied, Varner.101  In that case, the Eighth Circuit rejected the con-
tinuing violation theory on the grounds that performance of an anticompetitive 
contract was not a sufficient overt act capable of restarting the limitations pe-
riod.102  The dissent recognized Varner was an antitrust case arising out of tying 
arrangement and not a price-fixing conspiracy subject to the rule in Klehr.103  
According to the dissent, this distinction holds true for Midwestern Machinery 
Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., which was cited by the majority and argued by 
the dissent as inapposite.104 
After distinguishing conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial conduct, the 
dissent announced the rule for the former: “Under Klehr, [D]efendants here 
committed an overt act each time they used unlawfully acquired market power 
to charge an elevated price.”105 
Finally, the panel dissent dispensed with the policy rationale asserted by 
the majority and pointed out that those concerns are “irrelevant” for several 
reasons.106  First, according to the panel dissent, the plaintiff’s actual 
knowledge of the antitrust violation is not relevant to the question of whether 
the statutory period runs again.107  Second, the panel dissent argued the Klehr 
 
 97. Id. (quoting Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189 (1997)). 
 98. Id. (quoting McDonough v. Anoka Cty., 799 F.3d 931, 942 (8th. Cir. 2015)). 
 99. Id. at 950–51 (quoting McDonough, 799 F.3d at 942). 
 100. Id. at 951. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (citing Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (citing Midwestern Mach. Co. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 392 F.3d 265, 271 (8th 
Cir. 2004)). 
 105. Id. at 951–52 (quoting In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 752 
F.3d 728, 736 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal brackets omitted)). 
 106. Id. at 952. 
 107. Id. 
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rule does not allow a plaintiff to collect damages for injurious acts that occurred 
outside the limitations period, therefore dispensing with the worry that it will 
encourage frivolous suits or harm the public good.108  Finally, the panel dissent 
concluded that, as expressed in Wholesale Grocery, “the rule prevents compa-
nies from agreeing to divide markets for the purpose of raising prices, waiting 
four years to raise prices, then reaping the profits of their illegal agreement 
with impunity because any antitrust claims would be time barred.”109 
B.  Rehearing En Banc 
The Eighth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel decision, 
and reversed – with Judge Benton writing the majority opinion for a divided 
court.110  The opinion largely echoed the arguments from his panel dissent and 
set out a framework for continuing violations of the Sherman Act in the context 
of horizontal agreements to fix price.111  Relying on Klehr, the court held each 
sale in a price-fixing conspiracy at a supracompetitive price is an overt act that 
restarts the statute of limitations.112  The majority also correctly pointed out 
that cases relied on by the panel majority that considered continuing violations 
for other illegal business practices are distinguishable and unhelpful.113 
The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Shepherd and joined by three 
others, argued the majority incorrectly established that the conspiracy need not 
be ongoing at the time of the sale to the plaintiff.114  Instead, according to the 
en banc dissent, a plaintiff arguing she was harmed by a price-fixing conspiracy 
needs to show not only that she purchased the product but also that the con-
spiracy was “alive and ongoing” at the time of sale to restart the statute of lim-
itations.115  The en banc majority’s interpretation, according to the dissent, 
would allow “a new lawsuit against the defendants four (or 40) years from now 
so long as fill levels remain at 15 pounds, even if price fluctuates.”116 
V.  COMMENT 
The panel majority and the en banc dissent simply get it wrong.  First, 
they confuse different business practices made illegal under the antitrust laws 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (quoting In re Wholesale Grocery, 752 F.3d at 736 (internal quotation 
marks and brackets omitted)). 
 110. Ferrellgas II, 860 F.3d 1059, 1062–63 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 111. Id. at 1064–71; see Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d at 950–52 (Benton, J., dissenting). 
 112. Ferrellgas II, 860 F.3d at 1065. 
 113. Id. at 1067–68. 
 114. Id. at 1072 (Shepherd, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1075 n.6. 
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in applying the continuing violations theory to this case.  Antitrust is a notori-
ously difficult area of law,117 and courts frequently misapply inapposite theo-
ries as a result.  Second, both courts misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s dicta 
in Klehr, and neither court gave appropriate deference.  Given these errors, this 
Part concludes by refining the framework announced by the en banc majority 
and clarifying appropriate application of the continuing violations doctrine in 
the context of horizontal collusive agreements. 
A.   A Theoretical Mix-Up 
The panel majority muddled the continuing violations doctrine by apply-
ing it without reference to the antitrust practice at issue – a horizontal agree-
ment to fix price.  The existence of a continuing violation “depends heavily on 
the particular facts as well as the type of violation.”118  The panel majority con-
fuses the continuing violations doctrine as applied to tying arrangements and 
mergers with the straightforward horizontal conspiratorial price fixing that was 
present in this case.  In both tying and mergers, any anticompetitive harm that 
occurs happens and is made public primarily at the moment those agreements 
are executed.  For these antitrust violations, courts have been unwilling to ex-
tend the continuing violations doctrine past the date of execution unless new 
meetings or other cartel maintenance acts occur later and extend the limitations 
period.119  This is not true for agreements involving price fixing, in which the 
anticompetitive harm occurs primarily at the point where a consumer purchases 
a product or service at a supracompetitive price. 
For example, suppose in April 2017 two competitors enter into a naked 
price-fixing arrangement under which they agree to raise the price of their 
 
 117. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 337b (“[A]s any reader of 
this treatise will readily agree, applying antitrust law is very difficult.”).  Justice Anto-
nin Scalia famously said of antitrust law during his Senate confirmation hearing: “[I]n 
law school, I never understood [antitrust law].  I later found out, in reading the writings 
of those who now do understand it, that I should not have understood it because it did 
not make any sense then.”  Scalia Confirmation Hearing Day 1, C-SPAN (Aug. 5, 1986), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?150300-1/scalia-confirmation-hearing-day-1 (quoted 
portion begins at 20:15). 
 118. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 320c (emphasis added).  The treatise 
goes on to explain the continuing violations doctrine within the context of the different 
business practices made illegal by the antitrust laws. 
 119. See, e.g., Midwestern Mach. Co. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 392 F.3d 265, 271 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (“Applying this rationale to mergers makes no sense.  If the initial violation 
was the merger itself, none of the ‘continuing violations’ Midwestern alleges can justify 
restarting the statute of limitations because these acts were not undertaken to further an 
illegal policy of merger or to maintain the merger.”); Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 
F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004) (“We conclude that the Varners failed to plead suffi-
cient facts to support a cause of action for a tying-contract antitrust violation or to es-
tablish an exception to toll the statutes of limitations.  Performance of the alleged anti-
competitive contracts during the limitations period is not sufficient to restart the pe-
riod.”). 
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widgets by twenty percent.  The competitors’ conduct goes unchallenged for 
five years, when, in June 2022, a purchaser of the cartel’s widget sues alleging 
the competitors fixed prices in violation of the Sherman Act.  The anticompet-
itive harm occurred to the plaintiff not when the competitors made their nefar-
ious agreement in April 2017 but instead in June 2022 when she purchased the 
widget at a price twenty percent higher than she would have but for the 2017 
agreement.  A rule under which that purchaser could not sue might effectively 
allow some antitrust violations to go unpunished.  Once the four-year statute 
of limitations expires, colluders can charge supracompetitive prices with im-
punity for perpetuity. 
The leading antitrust treatise provides some additional guidance on ap-
plying the doctrine in the case of straightforward price-fixing cases: “Whether 
continuing high prices alone should be sufficient to toll the statute [of limita-
tions]” depends on whether, given the underlying facts, “continuing higher 
prices were a consequence of the price-fixing agreement.”120  In analyzing the 
facts, the treatise notes, “[I]f a cartel in a competitively structured market 
caused overnight increases in short-term prices, one would expect prices to 
move back to the [competitive] level very quickly after cartel enforcement 
ceased.”121  In such circumstances, “it would . . . be reasonable to infer contin-
uing acts from continuing higher prices.”122  Thus, a price-fixing agreement 
necessitates continued oversight by the parties to that agreement such that new 
overt acts are required to maintain supracompetitive prices. 
The panel majority applied an inapposite rule by confusing two types of 
cartel behavior: behavior where the primary anticompetitive harm occurs at the 
point of agreement and behavior where the primary anticompetitive harm oc-
curs at the point of sale.  Under the panel majority’s analysis, a plaintiff harmed 
by supracompetitive prices as a result of a price-fixing agreement that occurred 
more than four years before would have no redress.  Her claim would be barred 
even though at the time the limitations period expired she did not know of the 
conspiracy – indeed, she may not have even known she would have occasion 
to buy a propane tank. 
B.  Deference to Supreme Court Dicta 
The panel majority next erred in determining the language from Klehr did 
not deserve any deference from the court.  Klehr was a RICO case that rejected 
the “last predicate act rule,” which says a RICO action accrues when the plain-
tiff knew or reasonably should have known of the last predicate act that was a 
part of the same pattern of racketeering activity.123  The last predicate act did 
not have to result in injury but must have been part of the same pattern.124  The 
 
 120. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 320c2. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189 (1997). 
 124. See id. at 192. 
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Supreme Court compared the overt act requirement under a price-fixing con-
spiracy to the last predicate act rule under RICO.125  That language, while dicta 
since no antitrust violation was alleged, answers the question of whether sales 
made under a price-fixing agreement constituted continuing violations.126  The 
panel majority, instead of taking the language as the Supreme Court’s pro-
nouncement of an appropriate liability rule for continuing violations in price-
fixing cases, attempted to limit Klehr to its facts, noting Klehr “merely illus-
trate[s]” the rule.127  Federal appellate courts, however, “are bound by the Su-
preme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright 
holdings, particularly when . . . [the dicta] is of recent vintage and not enfeebled 
by any [later] statement.”128 
 
 125. Id. at 189. 
 126. Id. 
 
Antitrust law provides that, in the case of a continuing violation, say, a price-
fixing conspiracy that brings about a series of unlawfully high priced sales over 
a period of years, each overt act that is part of the violation and that injures the 
plaintiff, e.g., each sale to the plaintiff, starts the statutory period running again, 
regardless of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the alleged illegality at much earlier 
times. 
 
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 127. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 2016), vacated en banc, 860 F.3d 
1059 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 128. City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 557 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (alterations in original) (quoted in McDonough v. Anoka Cty., 799 F.3d 931, 
942 (8th Cir. 2015)); see also United States v. Augustine, 712 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (“This statement is dictum . . . but . . . . we accord it appropriate deference.”); 
McCravy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 176, 181 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e 
cannot simply override a legal pronouncement endorsed just last year by a majority of 
the Supreme Court.”); Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing that federal court of appeals is “bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as 
by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled 
by later statements”); United States v. Becton, 632 F.2d 1294, 1296 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(“We are not bound by dicta, even of our own court . . . . Dicta of the Supreme Court 
are, of course, another matter.”); Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(“Where there is no clear precedent to the contrary, we will not simply ignore the [Su-
preme] Court’s dicta.”); Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v. FERC, 78 F.3d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (“It may be dicta, but Supreme Court dicta tends to have somewhat greater force 
– particularly when expressed so unequivocally.”); McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 
F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (“We think that federal appellate courts are bound by the 
Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, 
particularly when . . . a dictum is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent 
statement.”). 
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While Klehr was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has not made any 
similar pronouncements, in dicta or otherwise, that contradict that rule.  More-
over, the federal circuits, including the Eighth Circuit in Wholesale Grocery,129 
have cited Klehr for the proposition that additional sales under a price-fixing 
cartel are overt acts that will restart the statute of limitations.130  The leading 
antitrust treatise also cites Klehr as instructive on the continuing violations doc-
trine for price-fixing cases.131  As a price-fixing case, Klehr directly controlled 
the Eighth Circuit here, and the panel majority erred in declining to follow the 
standard set forth in the opinion.  The appropriate deference to Supreme Court 
dicta, accepted by all lower federal courts as largely binding, was ignored.  
More questionably, the Eighth Circuit ignored its own precedent from Whole-
sale Grocery and incorrectly relied on Varner.132 
The en banc dissent agreed Klehr deserved deference but argued the en 
banc majority misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s dicta.133  According to the 
en banc dissent, the majority failed to recognize that, under Klehr, there must 
be an ongoing conspiracy at the time of sale in order for the sale to constitute 
an overt act capable of restarting the statute of limitations.134  The dissent relied 
 
 129. In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 752 F.3d 728, 736 (8th Cir. 
2014) (“The timeliness question in this case is controlled by Klehr . . . . Under Klehr, a 
monopolist commits an overt act each time he uses unlawfully acquired market power 
to charge an elevated price.”). 
 130. Oliver v. SD-3C LLC, 751 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Klehr, 521 
U.S. at 189) (“[T]he Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have recognized that 
each time a defendant sells its price-fixed product, the sale constitutes a new overt act 
causing injury to the purchaser and the statute of limitations runs from the date of the 
act.”); In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 290–91 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Klehr, 521 U.S. at 189) (noting that the complaint would be timely “so long as the 
plaintiffs made a purchase from the Defendants within [the limitations period]”); Mor-
ton’s Mkt., Inc. v. Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[E]ven 
if there were no price-fixing conversations after 1987 . . . if plaintiffs purchased milk 
at a fixed price after that date, the purchase would constitute an overt act that injured 
it.  A cause of action would accrue with each purchase and a new statutory period would 
begin to run.”). 
 131. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 320c1 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s 
Klehr decision limited the notion of continuing violations when no further injury flows 
from the subsequent acts.”). 
 132. Varner does not mention claims that defendants charged supracompetitive 
prices, or otherwise engaged in anticompetitive conduct.  See Varner v. Peterson Farms, 
371 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2004).  Instead, the Eighth Circuit in that case held plaintiffs 
had “failed to plead sufficient facts to support a cause of action for a tying-contract 
antitrust violation or to establish an exception to toll the statutes of limitations.”  Id. at 
1020.  There was no cognizable antitrust claim at all, regardless of the issue of timeli-
ness.  Perhaps most perplexing, however, Varner contains no citation to Klehr or any 
other reference to the appropriate rule to be applied to price-fixing cases.  There does 
not appear to be any basis for reading Varner to limit Klehr to the RICO context. 
 133. See Ferrellgas II, 860 F.3d 1059, 1071–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Shepherd, 
J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 1072. 
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on language from Klehr, arguing the Court’s analogy presumed that “a price-
fixing conspiracy that brings about a series of unlawfully high priced sales over 
a period of years continues to exist.”135  But the majority does account for this 
language.  The en banc majority recognizes the plaintiff need not merely prove 
she bought a product that was, at one time, the subject of an illegal conspiracy 
among propane manufacturers to fix price.136  She must also show the price she 
was charged – the harm she suffered – was supracompetitive.137  On this point, 
the en banc dissent and majority ought to agree.  With such confusion, a clearer 
pronouncement of the rule is in order. 
C.  An Alternative Proposal: When Did the New Anticompetitive Harm 
Occur? 
Underlying both the price-fixing rule announced in Klehr and the fine-
tuning rule applied to other conspiracy claims is the idea that a continuing vi-
olation occurs when there is some act that causes anticompetitive harm to the 
plaintiff.138  Recasting the inquiry in terms of when the most recent anticom-
petitive harm to the plaintiff occurred brings these seemingly disparate theories 
under one umbrella and should allow courts to choose the correct rule where 
the exact business practice at issue is not as clear as it was in the present case.  
This is not a novel idea: the Supreme Court has been clear, in the context of 
conspiracy claims, that “each time a plaintiff is injured by an act of the defend-
ants a cause of action accrues to him to recover the damages caused by that 
act.”139  Applying that formulation to the business practices already discussed 
helps to clarify the inquiry. 
1.  Price-Fixing Agreements 
At issue in this case is a so-called “naked” agreement to fix price.  Naked 
restraints of trade, as the term is used in antitrust jurisprudence, include any 
horizontal agreement among competitors that has the effect of raising price or 
reducing output.140  This definition is broad in the horizontal restraint context 
and applies even where two competitors do not literally agree to set prices at X 
 
 135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Klehr, 521 U.S. at 189). 
 136. Id. at 1063–64 (majority opinion). 
 137. Id. at 1068. 
 138. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971) 
(“In the context of a continuing conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws, such as the 
conspiracy in the instant case, this has usually been understood to mean that each time 
a plaintiff is injured by an act of the defendants a cause of action accrues to him to 
recover the damages caused by that act and that, as to those damages, the statute of 
limitations runs from the commission of the act.”). 
 139. Id.; accord Peck v. Gen. Motors Corp., 894 F.2d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 1990); 
Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 140. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 2000c. 
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dollars per widget.141  For example, as is true in this case, an agreement to 
reduce output, especially where the parties also agreed to maintain the current 
price despite that reduction, is plainly a naked restraint of trade.142 
Consistent with Klehr, for naked conspiratorial agreements, each sale of 
collusive items or services to the plaintiff at supracompetitive levels restarts 
the statutory period, regardless of the purchaser’s knowledge of the alleged 
illegality.143  The sale of an item at a supracompetitive price as a result of a 
price-fixing conspiracy will be an overt act sufficient to restart the statute of 
limitations where the plaintiff shows: (1) there was a conspiracy to fix the price 
of that item; (2) she purchased that item; and (3) the price of the product she 
purchased was “unlawfully high” – i.e., the price was supracompetitive as a 
result of the conspiracy.  Contrary to the en banc dissent’s warning, she cannot 
merely allege she bought a product that was at one time subject to the conspir-
acy.  For the sale to be an overt act, it must have been at a supracompetitive 
level.  That sale will restart the limitations period; the plaintiff will have four 
years from the date of sale to bring suit. 
Under Klehr, this rule should and does hold true even where the defend-
ants do not meet the fine-tuning requirement applied by some courts to other 
antitrust business practices.  For the straightforward agreement to fix price, the 
anticompetitive harm occurs to the plaintiff-purchaser at the time she buys a 
collusive product or service at a supracompetitive price, not when the cartel 
agreed to do so.144  This will be true for most price-fixing claims, which are 
typically brought by downstream purchasers and not by competitors who ben-
efit from the cartel and thus do not have standing to sue as a result of the anti-
trust injury requirement.145 
 
 141. Id. ¶ 2000b (“[T]he restraint on price may amount to less than outright price 
fixing, but nevertheless constitute a naked ‘price’ agreement.  For example, Catalano 
applied the per se rule to an agreement among beer wholesalers to eliminate the ‘grace’ 
period given to stores between the time of delivery and when the payment was due.  
Even though the agreement did not pertain to the beer price itself, the Court treated the 
agreement as if it were mere price fixing.” (footnotes omitted)) (discussing Catalano v. 
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648–49 (1980)). 
 142. See id. ¶ 2004b; see also NCAA. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 109–10 (1984) (holding that an agreement among competitors “not to compete in 
terms of price or output” is a “naked restraint,” and “no elaborate industry analysis is 
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement”). 
 143. See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189 (1997). 
 144. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968) 
(holding that plaintiff “proved injury . . . when it proved that [defendant] had over-
charged it during the damage period and showed the amount of the overcharge”); Am. 
Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 791 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is difficult to 
image [sic] a more typical example of anti-competitive effect than higher prices . . . .”); 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007). 
 145. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 348a (“[A] rival is actually ben-
efitted if its rivals merge, fix prices, or divide markets with the result that prices in the 
market increase.  Such rivals lack injury-in-fact and are denied standing.  Second, a 
rival may allege an antitrust violation by its rival(s) not to protect competition but to 
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This rule will encourage members of a price-fixing conspiracy to cheat 
on the agreement and lower price back to competitive levels in order to avoid 
creating antitrust liability for each sale made at supracompetitive levels.  Be-
cause of the nature of competitive markets, most price-fixing agreements nec-
essarily require some form of maintenance and policing, whether express or 
implied, in order to keep the members of the agreement from cheating.146  Rais-
ing the price on a product will lead to higher profits, but, because of basic prin-
ciples of supply and demand, it will also drive down output.147  This gives each 
cartel member an incentive to “cheat” by lowering its price slightly below the 
cartel level in order to increase output and profits.148  Once cheating begins to 
occur, the cartel is threatened and members risk losing access to supracompet-
itive profits.149 
The incentive to cheat among cartel members has caused many such car-
tels to unravel.  Given this truth, communications between cartel members in-
tended to police or maintain a price-fixing agreement should also fall under 
prior precedent on “fine-tuning,” which allows acts that further the objectives 
of the conspiracy or are not merely the “unabated inertial consequences” of 
 
protect itself from competition.  In that case the rival is injured in fact, but protecting 
rivals from greater competition or efficiency is inimical to the purpose of antitrust law.  
Such losses are not antitrust injury, so the rival is again denied standing.” (internal ci-
tations omitted)). 
 146. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 320c2 (“[I]f a cartel in a competi-
tively structured market caused overnight increases in short-term prices, one would ex-
pect prices to move back to the [competitive] level very quickly after cartel enforcement 
ceased.”).  The incentive to cheat creates instability in the cartel, essentially requiring 
some sort of policing in order to survive for an appreciable amount of time.  See id. ¶ 
2002f1 (“Individual members of a cartel always have an incentive to cheat and will do 
so when cheating seems profitable.  As a result, the managers of the cartel must be 
vigilant about detecting cheating and disciplining the cheater.”); see also Mercedes-
Benz Anti-trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 362 (D.N.J. 2001) (complaint adequately 
alleged antitrust injury and stated claim and for price-fixing conspiracy among Mer-
cedes-Benz distributor and numerous dealers with allegations of dealer meetings at 
which importance of not cutting price was discussed). 
 147. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726–27 (1988) 
(discussing cheating in the context of collusive vertical restraints of trade and holding 
that “without a further agreement on the price or price levels to be charged by the re-
maining dealer, almost always tends to restrict competition and reduce output”). 
 148. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 2002d.  Consider an example dis-
cussed in the leading antitrust treatise.  Suppose “the sellers are a cartel of ten identical 
firms, each selling 100 widgets per day at a price of $10.00.  Suppose that one firm in 
the cartel calculates that if it drops its own price to $9.00, its individual sales would rise 
to 150 units.  This individual cartel member’s revenues thus move from $1,000 (100 
widgets @ $10.00 each) to $1,350 (150 widgets @ $9.00 each), and this increase would 
almost certainly be profitable.”  Id. 
 149. Significantly, “the value of cheating is diminished as the number of cheaters 
grows, and if everyone cheats without limit, the market moves back to the competitive 
price.” Id.; see also THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 144 (2017). 
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some pre-limitations act to be sufficient to restart the limitations period.150  The 
Eighth Circuit panel majority recognized the alleged communications among 
the defendants were merely made to “reaffirm and monitor the existing con-
spiracy” and did not constitute acts sufficient to restart the statute of limita-
tions.151  In so deciding, the panel majority rejected the argument that “regu-
larly communicat[ing] to assure compliance with the conspiracy and moni-
tor[ing] the market to check that neither cheated” should constitute an overt act 
because those were only “mere reaffirmations” and not “fine-tun[ing].”152  
Treating policing and monitoring for cheating as a mere affirmation instead of 
new overt acts in furtherance of the price-fixing agreement indicates a lack of 
understanding of the economic forces at play: without monitoring for cheating, 
the “inertial consequence” would be an unraveling of the cartel. 
Allowing plaintiffs to continue to challenge the anticompetitive cartel by 
creating antitrust liability for each sale at a supracompetitive price encourages 
cartel members to cheat on their agreement and lower price.  The other category 
of overt acts that will restart the limitations period – monitoring and fine-tuning 
of the agreement by cartel members – will discourage communication between 
members, increasing the likelihood that the cartel will unravel.  This rule serves 
the main purpose of the antitrust laws: to protect consumers. 
2.  Other Anticompetitive Business Practices 
The continuing violations rules currently applied to other anticompetitive 
business practices can also be justified based on an approach that asks when 
the anticompetitive harm to the plaintiff occurred.  Recall Varner, in which the 
Eighth Circuit announced the continuing violations rule to be applied to anti-
competitive tying arrangements.153  It held “when a complaining party was 
fully aware of the terms of an agreement when it entered into the agreement, 
an injury occurs only when the agreement is initially imposed; thus, the limi-
tations period typically is not tolled by the requirements placed on the parties 
under the agreement.”154  Similarly, in the context of anticompetitive mergers, 
the Eighth Circuit held “the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 
plaintiff suffers injury.  But where the plaintiff’s injury is immediate . . . the 
statute of limitations begins to run at that time.”155  The difference in applica-
tion for non-cartel practices is that the overt act requirement may not be ful-
filled at the same time as the injury to the plaintiff and so must be determined 
separately. 
 
 150. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 151. Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d 943, 949 (8th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added), vacated en 
banc, 860 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1018–19 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 154. Id. at 1020. 
 155. Midwestern Mach. Co. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 392 F.3d 265, 276 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(internal citations omitted). 
21
Hills: When Cheating Is Good
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
216  MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
The current liability rule, under which only an initial agreement to fix 
price would constitute an overt act capable of restarting the limitations period, 
effectively allows firms to engage in illegal price fixing and, once four years 
has passed since the date the agreement was executed, indefinitely charge su-
pracompetitive prices without punishment or oversight.  Such a rule contra-
venes the goal of the antitrust laws to protect consumers and competition156 
and instead transforms the statute of limitations into a tool for barring claims 
designed to prohibit anticompetitive conduct. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The continuing violations doctrine under the Sherman Act allows an an-
titrust claimant to restart the limitations period where some overt act is suffi-
cient to be considered an antitrust violation on its own.  The Eighth Circuit 
considered the issue of what acts are sufficient to restart the limitations period 
in In re Pre-filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litigation.157  The majority opinion 
from rehearing en banc corrected many of the failures of the panel majority 
below.158  The rules for price fixing and the rules for other business practices 
are not the same. By misapplying the rule from one business practice to the 
business practice at issue and failing to defer to Supreme Court dicta, the 
Eighth Circuit panel majority broke from both its own precedent and that of its 
sister circuits. 
The majority opinion on rehearing was largely curative.  The continuing 
violations doctrine must be strictly analyzed within the context of the illegal 
business practice at issue.  An alternative framework will guide lower federal 
courts attempting to apply the doctrine with uniformity.  In the context of con-
spiratorial agreements to fix price, the sale of an item at a supracompetitive 
price will restart the statute of limitations where the plaintiff shows: (1) there 
was a conspiracy to fix the price of that item; (2) she purchased that item; and 
(3) the price of the product she purchased was “unlawfully high” – i.e., the 
price was supracompetitive as a result of the conspiracy.  This rule serves the 
purpose of the antitrust laws – to protect consumers by promoting competition 
– by encouraging the unraveling of anticompetitve cartels.  It does so by en-
couraging behavior rarely advised: cheat more, communicate less.  
 
 
 156. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990) (“The 
antitrust laws were enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’” (quot-
ing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))). 
 157. See Ferrellgas I, 834 F.3d at 949. 
 158. See Ferrellgas II, 860 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2017). 
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